have developed an ambitious research program that focuses on the role of universal psychological constraints in the evolution of culture (Atran 2003; Boyer 2000; Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004) . One of their main hypotheses is that cultural ideas or practices owe most of their success and stability in time and space to universal mechanisms of the human mind. Psychological constraints orient human minds when they learn, teach, remember, choose, endorse or transform all sorts of culturally transmitted information. As a result, cultural forms that fit these constraints tend to stabilize. This view of culture seems unconvincing to many, and perhaps most, anthropologists or social scientists.
skepticism. Everything else being equal, a belief that allows us to make sense of events by appealing to a form of intentional agency will benefit from a favorable prejudice. Boyer signals, in support of his interpretation, the fact that it helps explain the way the Kwaio focus on strategic information, and more generally the lacunar character of representations of ghosts and spirits.
When does cultural epidemiology work?
Each one of these three studies relies on strong, speculative and debatable psychological hypotheses. My point here is not to discuss in detail the merits of their arguments. Instead, I would like to ask a question.
Suppose these authors are right, and cultural things like adalo, 'cooties' or etiquette rules are successful and stable mostly because they appeal to universal properties of the human mind. Are these cases typical of cultural transmission in general? Or must some special conditions be met if we want cultural items to survive by means of their universal psychological effects? I think 'cooties'-lore, etiquette rules and adalo beliefs are indeed transmitted in special conditions--not weird, not uncommon, but special.
Etiquette Norms
-What makes cultural transmission special in the case of European norms of etiquette is indeed quite banal: if Nichols was able to measure the differential survival of Erasmus' prescriptions, that is because enough time had passed for many of them to die out. The fate of cultural habits is not so often measured at an interval of several centuries. Had Nichols carried out his experiment with European students a few years after Erasmus' book was published, the results would probably have been quite different. In particular, the impact of core disgust might have been harder to detect, as Erasmus' authority would have carried more weight. After all, On Good Manners for Boys was not just any manners guide. The Renaissance equivalent of a best-seller (130 editions, translated in four languages soon after its publication), it was written by one of Europe's first intellectual superstars. That is a triviality but, I hope to show, one with many consequences: selection, when it takes the form of differential survival, takes some time. On shorter timescales, the effect of people better remembering and transmitting disgust-related rules may be too noisy to be detectable. It may also be blurred by local accidents, like the influence of Erasmus.
Contamination Games
-The traditions around games of contamination also depend on a special network of cultural transmission. Everyone who has written on the topic agrees that 'cooties'-lore and other contamination traditions are passed on from child to child, with little or no adult intermediation. They form part of children's very own peer-culture (Hirschfeld 1997; Opie and Opie 1959) . Only one out of Sue Samuelson's forty-five informants had not first heard of 'cooties' through a peer (Samuelson 1980) . Being handled down from child to child is a permanent challenge to the stability of children's peer cultures.
Consider a population of children between six and twelve years old-a group of comrades at a primary school for instance. Let us define their peer-culture as including everything that is passed on between the children of the group, while they are between six and twelve years old. In this population, around one sixth of the children will be replaced every year. Every year the eldest children-probably the most knowledgeable about their peer-culture-will leave childhood and be replaced by a contingent of younger children. Six years later, there may not be a single child in the group to remember the group of six years ago.
This rate of population renewal is much higher than that of most human societies. It means that, if a tradition has lasted much longer than sixty years (as have many rhymes and games in children's peer cultures, including 'cooties'-lore- Samuelson 1980, Opie and Opie 1959) then, in our population of children, it has risked complete extinction ten times at the very least. Ten times, the population has been entirely renewed, with the risk, for each new generation, that it might not come into contact with the tradition. In a regular human society, where people of fifty can teach songs and games to children of five, a tradition can last sixty years and risk extinction only once. A fifty-year old woman can ensure a song a decent life expectancy by teaching it once to her son; in children's peer cultures that is not possible. If a child manages to transmit a song to her peers, she will buy it only a few years of survival. The vast majority of the participants in the peer-culture are beyond her reach: they are not yet born. When these new participants arrive in the culture, current children will not be children anymore. In these conditions, children's peer-transmitted games and rhymes have to be intuitive and attractive: in constantly shifting populations, their hyper-frequent transmission is a matter of survival. One might speculate that this is why the products of children's peer cultures are so catchy: boring rhymes simply died out.
There is a link between the extension of a transmission chain in time and space, and its narrowness.
Typically, when a chain extends in time and space, most of the individuals the chain includes will drift out of reach of others in the chain. We saw that happen in most of our examples. In the case of adalo, demographic scarcity, geographical scattering and the extension of the chain in time all concur to prevent religious 'broadcasting'. In children's peer cultures, demographic distance is to blame for narrowness: a child does not have access to most other children in the peer-culture, because most of them are not born, or are not children anymore. Still, the techniques that allow us to communicate across long distances in time (archeological investigations, writing, institutions like libraries, monuments, etc.) and space (regular and extensive travel to densely populated places, institutions for scientific or religious propagation, mass-reproduced writing, TV, etc.) are all quite recent in human evolution, and their influence can be ruled out in many cases. In many societies, there is simply no way for one individual to visit a vast number of people across distances of centuries and hundreds of kilometers. As a result, the proportion of individuals that each person in the chain can reach directly rapidly reaches a ceiling. A quick evolution towards 'narrowcasting' is unavoidable when a transmission chain reaches a certain length.
In even more cases, heavy broadcasting will be present, but it will not be sufficient for some individuals to come into contact with most participants in the chain. With all his prestige, his connections and the diffusive power of the printing press, Erasmus' influence on European manners got diluted with time. This puts a limit on models of cultural diffusion that stress the impact of well-connected or prestigious individuals, imitated by their followers, for cultural transmission. Such individuals no doubt exist and, on a short timescale, they are indeed influential. There is a dilemma, though: the ideas that these individuals propagate either owe their success to their intrinsic interest, or to the prestige of the well-connected. If their success is explained by their intrinsic properties, they will no doubt enjoy a competitive advantage, with a little help from their prestigious propagandist, in longer transmission chains. In that case, leader influence can only enhance the success that the idea would have enjoyed anyway, because of its intrinsic interest. On the other hand, if it is entirely arbitrary and explained by leader influence alone, then it will not survive through a long transmission chain, unless that chain is very broad. One might answer that social groups can conserve local arbitrary traditions for quite a long time, for instance as a result of conformism. But long chains of cultural transmission typically span several societies (not only for technologies, but also for major political, legal and religious innovations). Local conservation of arbitrary traditions, since it is arbitrary, will differ for each society, and hence be averaged out as the chain grow long (if it is also narrow enough for each society to feed the chain).
The local impact of social influences, spectacular as it may seem when short scales are observed, is not necessarily scalable at the level of long diffusion chains. On other scales, models stressing local social influences may be more appropriate than models based on psychological hypotheses.
Long and narrow chains as windows to the human mind
Cultural learners are choosy. They don't learn, adopt, endorse or produce cultural ideas at random, nor is their choice driven by deference or conformity alone. Among the factors that determine their choices, some are idiosyncratic, some are shared with others, some are as good as universal. Cultural epidemiologists are interested in the mental mechanisms that consistently orient cultural choices in roughly everyone. Yet being cognitively attractive does not, by itself, make a cultural item successful. For that to happen, culture must be able to travel long, narrow chains of cultural transmission.
When such chains can be observed to work, they teach us a lot about the human mind in its most general aspects. Think of the population of American students tested in an average psychological experiment: so few people, so uniform, so similar from one experiment to the other, so far removed from the rest of humanity in so many respects (Henrich et al. 2010) . Now consider all the individuals feeding a long and narrow cultural transmission chain: so many people, from so many times and places, from so many stages of life and situations -so representative a sample of mankind! When an idea travels through these thousands, millions of different heads, it passes through as many millions of psychological filters, all different, yet with a small cluster of features in common. Along the chain, idiosyncratic and local features all pull in different, inconsistent directions: their effects will be averaged out as the chain grows longer. On the other hand, reliable and consistent features will show clearly through the chain, idiosyncratic features being washed out.
Culture transmitted in this way will bear the mark of general structures of the human mind: psychology drives culture, when culture travels long and narrow chains. But not all cultural things come from such chains, and we cannot treat culture as a mere reflection of the human mind -which is why we need to combine predictions derived from psychology with insights derived from the social sciences and the humanities.
